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1 Introduction
In 2002 and 2007, during the French presidential elections, several experi-
ments have taken place, designed to test the reaction of the public to new
voting rules. What have we learned from them so far ? These experiments
are of a rather original nature and raise several methodological issues with
respect to their design and to the analysis of their results. In order to as-
sert what can be learned and what cannot be learned, I will discuss the
methodological issues at stake. I will in particular show that the conclusions
to be derived from such experiments are very sensitive to some details of the
protocol and also to some details of the voting rules under scrutiny.
The main goal of these experiments is the comparative study of voting
rules. Therefore the closest precedents are (a) comparative studies of voting
rules across countries/time ; (b) some rare comparative studies of voting
rules within one election ; (c) laboratory experiments on voting rules. Point
(a) is a major trend in Political Science. It mixes the questions of voter
behavior and party behavior, which is certainly a virtue from the point of
view of realism but a problem for scientific analysis. By definition, (a) is not
interested in non-existing voting rules. Point (b) is rare, one example being
the study done during the election of the council of the Social Choice and
Welfare society in 19991. Point (c) is also rare but we now have some studies
of this type: Forsythe et al. (1993, 1996), Blais et al (2007, 2008, 2009),
Béhue et al. (2009), Kube and Puppe (2009).
1See Brams and Fishburn (2001), Saari (2001) and Laslier (2003). The survey Brams
and Fishburn (2006) contains discussions of various instances of Approval Voting which
can be considered as somehow in between observation and experimentation.
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A complete description of the protocol of these “live experiments” will
be provided in the next section2 but two main points should be mentioned
now:
• Participating to such an experiment has no direct consequence. Such is
also the case in opinion survey, and experiments are a priori facing the
same methodological diﬃculties as survey research. In particular the
participation bias might be important. Correcting for the bias is more
diﬃcult than in a survey because we do not know the personal charac-
teristics of each respondent, see section 5. On that point, these “live”
or ”in situ” experiments should be contrasted with laboratory exper-
iments that follow the standards of experimental economics, in which
participants incentives are controlled through monetary rewards.3
• The experience uses the decorum and etiquette of a true election. In
particular, open participation, anonymity and confidentiality are guar-
anteed to the participants. This is diﬀerent from pool surveys and from
laboratory experiments. The event is also presented like a scientific
test of a voting rule, and not like an exit pool. It seems reasonable (al-
though we have no absolute proof of that) to think that this framing
lowers the participation and observation biases.
This kind of experiments raises several methodological problems :
1. There is obviously no control of the political supply. The situation is
similar to comparative analysis since the political situation can only
be the real one, but the political situation does not vary and thus no
comparison is done !
2. There is no control of the sample. The protocol described above im-
poses that participants cannot be selected, so the only selection is
self-selection.
3. Each observation is relatively poor, because an observation is just one
anonymous ballot from a pooling station. Even if ballots are complex as
2The original papers are: Balinski et al.(2003), Balinski and Laraki (2007), Baujard
and Igersheim (2007), Laslier and Van der Straeten (2002, 2004, 2008). See also a similar
experiment on Approval Voting made in the town of Messel (Germany) by Alos-Ferrer
and Granic (2009), during the 2008 state elections in Hesse.
3Principles of experimental economics are explained in Davis and Holt (1993). For
experiments in Political Science, see Green and Gerber (2002). Examples of experiments
on voting include Fiorina and Plott (1978), McKelvey and Ordeshook (1990), Wantchekon
(2003).
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are ballots of approbation, ranking or evaluation, no other individual
characteristic is known.4
4. We do not know exactly what is the voter’s understanding of the voting
rule. If the voting rule on test is complex, then some voters may not
know how the ballots will be counted.
5. There are potential ethical problems in case some voter understand
incompletely or even wrongly the voting rule itself or the goal of the
experiment.
The methodological problems are related on one hand to diﬃculties for
the voter to complete the task and to understand the voting rule and the
experiment; and on the other hand to diﬃculties for the researcher to reach
sound conclusions on the basis of the collected data. The next section de-
scribe the experiments. The two following ones are devoted to the problems
on the voters side (Section 3) and to the analytical diﬃculties (Section 4).
2 Description of the experiment
I here describe the experiment made on April 21, 2001, during the first
round of the French presidential election. Recall that the French presidential
election is a runoﬀ system. If a candidate gets at least 50% of the votes in
the first round, he or she is elected. If no candidate gets at least 50% of the
score (which is usually the case), the first two candidates meet in a runoﬀ
round. Who gets the majority of the votes in this second round is elected.
In 2001, 16 candidates were vying. Jacques Chirac (Rassemblement pour
la République, conservative) came first. He was followed by Jean-Marie Le
Pen (Front National, nationalistic law-and-order movement) and the former
prime minister Lionel Jospin (Parti Socialiste) came third. This event was a
big surprise. I first describe the experimental protocol, and then give some
elementary statistics about the obtained data.
2.1 The protocol
The experiment was run in six voting places: the single voting post of the
village of Gy-les-Nonains (Loiret) and five (out of twelve) voting posts in the
city of d’Orsay (Essonne). Gy has 482 registered voters and the five voting
4Baujard and Igersheim (2007) slightly move away from this methodology by asling
participants to fill questionaires.
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posts in Orsay include 4,237 registered voters. We were kindly helped by the
people locally in charge of the organization of the election.
One week before the election day, we sent to each registered voter a letter
at his/her personal address. The voting rule to be tested (Approval Voting,
with no runoﬀ) was explained, we carefully explained that the experiment
was done for scientific purpose and would not interfere with the oﬃcial
vote, and we asked for their kind participation. The same information was
provided in the municipal bulletin.
On the day of the election, we set specific voting booths, tables, and
urns, in the same room (or in an adjacent room) where the oﬃcial vote
was taking place. After voting for the oﬃcial vote, the voter was invited to
proceed to participate to the experiment.
He or she received an approval voting ballot paper with the names of all
candidates and could fill it and return it anonymously.
Everything in fact was designed to mimic the oﬃcial voting procedure.
Note that only the voters who turned out for the oﬃcial vote were able to
participate to the experiment.
2.2 Some statistics
In France, almost every citizen above 18 is registered as a voter. The ratio
of votes to registered voters measures the turn out. Turn out may be high
for the presidential election. Participants to the experiment all came to vote
for the oﬃcial vote, so the participation rate at the experiment is defined as
the percentage of participants among the voters who were present on this
day.. Voters’ reaction to the experiment was generally favorable and high
participation rates were observed: about 75% in Orsay and more than 90%
in Gy-les-Nonains. Table 1 provides these figures.
Gy Orsay All
Oﬃcial Registered voters 482 4237 4719
Votes cast 395 2951 3346
Turn out rate 82.0% 69.6% 70.9%
Experimental Participants 365 2232 2597
Participation rate 92.4% 75.6% 77.6%
Table 1: Participation at the experiment
On average, a voter approved of 3.15 candidates, out of 16. The distri-
bution around this value is rather smooth, as can be seen in Table 2. One
can notice that one-name ballots are not over-represented.
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Average number : 3,15 out of 16
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >10
36 287 569 783 492 258 94 40 16 6 1 5
Table 2: Number of approved candidates
In order to give a flavor of the data obtained from this experiment, Tables
3 provides the “association matrix” for one voting post (Gy-les-Nonains).
In this symmetric matrix, candidates are in line and in collumn. In the
cell corresponding to candidates A and B is indicated the number of voters
who approved both A and B. In the diagonal are the candidates’ approval
scores. For instance, 139 participants approved Jacques Chirac (Jc), and the
number 51 at the intersection of the line Jc and the column LP means that
51 participants approved both Jacques Chirac and Jean-Marie Le Pen.
Jc Lp Lj Fb A l Jp Nm Ob Js Am Rh Bm Ct C l Cb Dg
Jc 139 51 15 47 10 28 11 10 36 48 3 31 5 9 6 3
Lp 51 119 10 22 18 17 9 13 21 22 5 44 3 5 4 4
Lj 15 10 87 14 21 17 40 24 11 5 26 0 23 9 5 4
Fb 47 22 14 85 10 25 13 9 10 33 3 13 8 14 7 2
A l 10 18 21 10 64 13 19 24 10 3 18 6 11 11 7 12
Jp 28 17 17 25 13 67 10 11 10 19 2 7 8 11 4 3
Nm 11 9 40 13 19 10 67 32 7 9 15 3 15 10 4 12
Ob 10 13 24 9 24 11 32 62 10 8 16 9 16 13 3 15
Js 36 21 11 10 10 10 7 10 74 18 5 13 5 6 6 4
Am 48 22 5 33 3 19 9 8 18 77 2 15 4 10 6 3
Rh 3 5 26 3 18 2 15 16 5 2 37 0 5 4 3 7
Bm 31 44 0 13 6 7 3 9 13 15 0 62 1 2 4 4
Ct 5 3 23 8 11 8 15 16 5 4 5 1 33 7 4 3
C l 9 5 9 14 11 11 10 13 6 10 4 2 7 36 5 4
Cb 6 4 5 7 7 4 4 3 6 6 3 4 4 5 21 1
Dg 3 4 4 2 12 3 12 15 4 3 7 4 3 4 1 26
Table 3: Association matrix at Gy-les-Nonains
Table 4 provides the relative candidate scores in the experiment and
the oﬃcial vote. Notice that the approval scores can be expressed either in
proportion of the number of ballots or in proportion of the total number
of approvals. In the second case the sum of percentages is 100. The two
computations are equivalent up to the ratio of total approvals to total ballots,
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that is the average number of approvals per ballot.
Experiment “Approval Voting ” Oﬃcial score
% ballots. % approvals % ballots
J. Chirac 38.19 % 13.16 % 19.64 %
J.-M. Le Pen 32.69 % 11.27 % 19.64 %
L. Jospin 23.90 % 8.24 % 11.11 %
F. Bayrou 23.35 % 8.05 % 6.72 %
A. Laguiller 17.58 % 6.06 % 13 %
J.-P. Chevènement 18.41 % 6.34 % 4.65 %
N. Mamère 18.41 % 6.34 % 4.65 %
O. Besancenot 17.03 % 5.87 % 2.84 %
J. Saint-Josse 20.33 % 7.01 % 9.56 %
A. Madelin 21.16 % 7.29 % 5.17 %
R. Hue 10.16 % 3.50 % 3.10 %
B. Mégret 17.03 % 5.87 % 2.84 %
C. Taubira 9.07 % 3.12 % 0.52 %
C. Lepage 9.89 % 3.41 % 2.84 %
C. Boutin 5.76 % 1.99 % 0.78 %
D. Gluckstein 7.14 % 2.46 % 1.81 %
Total 290.11 % 100 % 100 %
Table 4: Candidate scores at Gy-les-Nonains. Average number of aproval
per ballot is 2.90
Tables like these ones are the data obtained from in situ experiments.
This kind of data has been used by Laslier and Van der Straeten (2002,
2004), Baujard and Igersheim (2007) or Laslier (2008); see Section 4.
2.3 Replications
This protocol was first fine-tuned and tested in a pilot experiment with stu-
dents at Sciences Po Paris by Balinski, Laslier and Van der Straeten in Jan-
uary 2002 where we tested for two voting rules: Approval Voting and Range
Voting with the 0-10 scale. It was then used by Balinski, Laraki, Laslier and
Van der Straeten during the 2002 presidential election, as explained above.
During the 2007 presidential election, several teams more or less repli-
cated the same protocol. Baujard and Igersheim tested for Approval Voting
and for Range Voting with grades 0, 1 and 2. They also had some partici-
pants filling a questionnaire about the experiment. (Baujard and Igersheim
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2007.) Balinski and Laraki tested for an evaluative method they call the
“majority judgement.” Farvaque, Jayet and Ragot (2009) asked voters to
rank-order the candidates as a test of Single Transferable Vote.
In Germany Alós—Ferrer and Grani´c (2009) tested Approval Voting
3 Voter’s diﬃculties
The question of the voter’s understanding of a voting rule is delicate because
it must be raised at diﬀerent levels. The first level is : How to materially
fill the ballot ? The second level is : How will the paper ballots be counted
? The third level is : What are the implications of that particular ballot-
ing procedure ? During the experiments, participants ask for explanations
at these diﬀerent levels. Some participants claim that “they do not under-
stand.” Nevertheless, the vast majority, if asked, answer that “they under-
stand.” Further discussion shows that any of the three above questions can
trigger a positive or negative answer to the question “Do I understand the
experiment?”
3.1 Diﬃculties to complete the task
Almost all voters understand that they are asked to make marks, give points,
or chose adjectives. In many cases, this knowledge will be suﬃcient to trigger
an aﬃrmative answer to the question “Do you understand ?”
A specific problem arises for voting rules in which voters grade candi-
dates, with ordinal or cardinal grades. In the pilot experiment at Science
Po made by Balinski, Laslier and Van der Straeten on January 23, 2002,
the average evaluation of candidates on the 0 − 10 scale was 2.21 points,
but that figure may be misleading since many grades were 0. Out of the
408×15 = 6120 recorded grades, about half of them are 0. Many ballots in-
cluded simultaneously candidates with the 0 grade and candidates without
any grade. This seems to indicate that giving a 0 grade and not grading may
have two diﬀerent meanings for the voter. We, nevertheless, had precisely
indicated on the ballot that not grading a candidate will be counted as a
0 grade. The same problem potentially arises in the experiment of Baujard
and Igersheim (2007) with the 0− 1− 2 scale and the additive rule.
How to solve this problem ? A possibility is computing not exactly the
sum of the points obtained by the candidate (or, equivalently, the average
with respect to the total number of voters) but the average with respect
to the number of voters who have eﬀectively graded the candidate. This
is mathematically equivalent to replacing the missing grades of a candidate
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by the average of the observed grades of the considered candidate. This is
impossible to justify. It might have in practice the odd consequence that can-
didates who are almost unknown will have the best grades because they tend
to be known by their supporters rather than by their opponents. Therefore
this is clearly not a good solution.
A reasonable solution to this problem is to explain to the voters that
they are not asked to evaluate the candidates but to give points to the can-
didates. This is what happens in Approval Voting, and it apparently causes
no misunderstanding. More detailed grading systems can be presented in
the same manner if the electoral rule is that a candidate finally receives the
total of points given to him or her by all the voters, such as the case in
“cumulative” voting, in “range” voting, or in “le vote par note.”
The diﬀerence between saying “You are to evaluate the candidates. The
candidate who will receive the largest average evaluation will be elected”
and saying “You are to give points to candidates. The candidate who will
receive the most points will be elected” is obsolete but is relevant. The
second formulation is more concrete, which is always a good thing for an
explanation. It is also neutral because it is purely factual and does not
pre-suppose or impose any interpretation of the voter’s action. The word
“evaluation” is closer to a particular interpretation of the meaning of the
vote. But the voter is free to give any meaning to her/his vote. She/he might
want to give many points to a candidate she/he does not value much. Why
not ? That is obviously her/his right and the legislator must not make a
confusion between the statement of the electoral rule and the interpretation
of people’s action. Therefore, as well as for the practical reason mentioned
above, explanations should be as factual as possible. Baujard and Igersheim
(2007) have carefully analyzed the spoiled ballots and missing grades in their
data. They conclude that with the 0− 1− 2 scale and the simple counting
rule, voters have no diﬃculties in completing the task.
When voters are asked to rank-order all candidates, they usually have
no problem in ranking the main candidates, but have a problem for the
other ones. This may cause serious problems for the Borda rule and other
rank-based methods such as Alternative vote (STV) with the Hare or the
Coombs system of transfers. Another problem is that, in practice, to rank-
order a large set of candidate is a complicated task. This is a well-known
problem in countries where these systems are in use. A practical solution
to this “over-long ballot paper” problem is to let the voter follow some pre-
specified ranking agreed by political parties, as done for instance for the
Australian Senate election (see Farrell 2001).
When grades are presented as adjectives, as in Balinski and Laraki
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(2007), the confusion between a missing grade and the worst evaluation is
not justified since the use of adjectives is intended to impose “true” mean-
ing to the grades on top of what they actually are: being counted in the
maximum-median calculus.
3.2 Voter’s understanding of the voting rule per se
One may conclude that, apart from the (potentially important) question of
the missing grades, participants have no diﬃculties completing the material
task asked. In that sense, voters can answer “Yes” to the question “Do
you understand”. But of course one should not infer from such an answer
that the voter has understood correctly how the ballots will be counted.
The voter may be unaware that there are diﬀerent, non-equivalent, ways
to count complex ballots, because this fact is seldom known in the general
public. And even if she/he is aware of this fact, for instance because she/he
has read documents about the experiment before the election day, she/he
may have nevertheless failed to grasp the details, for diﬀerent reasons.
This problem is of variable importance for diﬀerent voting rules. At one
extreme, there can hardly be any misunderstanding with simple counting
procedures like FPTP or AV, so that one-sentence explanations are suﬃ-
cient to avoid any misunderstanding. At the other extreme, complex ballots
demanding ranks, scores, or grades can be counted in many diﬀerent ways
so that one cannot trust that the participants to the experience have under-
stood the voting rule.
The solution to this problem, following the standard good practice in
experimental economics, is to show very concretely how ballots are counted
before proceeding to the experiment, and to make sure that participants have
assimilated the counting process. This is possible in the laboratory even with
rules as complex as Alternative Vote with the Hare system of transfers, as
noticed by Blais et al. (2009). But this is unfortunately not feasible during
the kind of “live” experiments at hand. Consequently, we must face the pos-
sibility that many voters who participated to the 2007 experiments on STV
or “le jugement majoritaire” were simply not understanding how ballots
were counted. Two questions emerge: Why would individuals participate to
something they do not understand ? Is that so important ?
Anyone who participated in 2002 or in 2007, as a voter or as an ex-
perimentalist, to these events noted that they are quite pleasant. The at-
mosphere is rather friendly, most people seem rather happy to participate
and, in addition, such an event is a positive social event. We know from the
experiments of Gerber, Green and Larimer (2008) that the social pressure
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is a very important determinant of turnout. Indeed positive social pressure
seems to have been high during these experiments, in particular in some
places (it may explain the extraordinary 92.4% participation rate in the
small village of Gy-les-Nonains). It is therefore very likely that some voters
participate to the experiments even without a good understanding of the
voting rule at stake, when the voting rule is complex.
Is it important, for these experiments, that voters have an exact and
clear understanding of how ballots are counted ? Obviously yes, this point
is crucial, for at least two diﬀerent reasons.
1. Voting behavior may be diﬀerent depending on the voting rule. Po-
litical science has taught us that people may not use single-name ballots
the same way in One-round FPTP, Two-round, or PR elections. Economic
theory has explained that rational behavior in voting is also sensitive to the
details of the voting rule. Therefore, from the methodological point of view,
if the objective is to learn about voters’ behavior, and later to compare
voting rules, it is essential to make sure that the voting rule itself is well
understood.
2. If some participants do not understand clearly the voting rule and
realize that they don’t, they may have the impression that the scientists
have hidden something on purpose. The same thing happens for a voter who
first thinks she/he has well understood and later discover that she/he had
not. Deceiving the participants when doing experiments about democracy
should certainly be avoided. The risk is a loss of trust towards scientific work
in politics. The worst thing that could happen is that scientists present
themselves as “those who understand a complex voting rule” in front of
“those who do not have to understand” but are asked to cooperate.
Not cheating is important with respect to both professional ethics and
methodology.
3.3 Voter’s understanding of the consequences of the voting
rule
A third level of comprehension has to do with the implication for Politics
of the proposed voting rule. It is noticeable that some participants immedi-
ately skip to this level. For instance, one participant would comment (about
Approval Voting) “Yes, I understand what you do. This is to give voice to
the small candidates.” In that case, we are facing a problem opposite to the
previous one: over-confident participants believe they know, or believe we
know, something which is far from being established.
The same mechanism may result in a negative opinion with respect to the
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idea of experimentation following a “You are playing with fire” comment of
argumentation. I heard this reasoning several times in 2001 from scholars and
oﬃcials when looking for places to perform the 2002 experiment. Generally,
we experiment in order to learn things we do not know. The fact that we
do not know in advance the result of an experiment should obviously not be
considered as a problem, as long as we do not try to make the public believe
that we already know what is good and what is not.
On that issue, there is no doubt that all these experiments are very
positive. The general public seems both reasonable and respectful when it
comes to the idea of experimenting new voting rules, even more reasonable
and respectful than learned scholars.5 This is one more reason not to deceive.
4 Analyzing the results
The collected data is diﬃcult to analyze because of possibly important biases
due to the specific experimental protocol. This point is discussed in the next
section. But this diﬃculty should not hide the richness of the collected data,
which is amenable to original and insightful analysis, as explained in section
4.2.
4.1 The participation bias
The participation bias in those kind of events may be huge. In the pilot
experiment of January 23, 2002, the approbation rate of Chirac was 33.58
% whereas the approbation rate of Jospin was 61.76 %, which probably
reflects a strong leftist bias among participants.
Table 5 deals with the six voting stations where the experiment was done
in 2002. It provides the number of voters at the oﬃcial vote, the number
of Le Pen’s oﬃcial votes. Voting stations are ordered according to Le Pen’s
score in percentage. The two last lines indicate the participation rate at the
experiment, and the number of approvals in favor of Le Pen. We can see
in Orsay an inverse correlation between the participation rate and Le Pen’s
support. it is for instance remarkable that in Orsay 12, 88 voters voted for Le
Pen at the oﬃcial vote but 63 voters approved Le Pen at the experimental
5 In 2002, a priori negative opinions about these experiments were held by some col-
leagues, and some elected oﬃcials. They predicted very low participation rates, based
on their own claimed experience in organizing public consultation on local issues. Some
were reluctant to the very idea of experimentation in the field of politics, arguing that, by
principle, one should not mix serious political matters with adventurous ideas.
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(2002) Gy Or. 12 Or. 6 Or. 7 Or. 1 Or. 5
Voters 395 622 607 635 522 565
LePen votes
76
19.2%
88
14.1%
49
8.1%
45
7.1%
35
6.7%
35
6.2%
Participation 92.4% 66.7% 75.8% 55.3% 78.3% 84.2%
LePen approvals
119
32.6%
63
15.2%
55
12.0%
38
8.1%
52
12.7%
51
10.7%
Table 5: Participation biais in 2002 experiments
vote. In that respect, the results obtained in the small village of Gy-Les-
Nonains are important because the participation is almost complete here,
even if the extreme right vote is more important in this village than it is in
the city of Orsay.
Some apparent conclusions from gross figures, such as the idea that some
voting systems like approval voting, favors the center and are detrimental
to extreme candidates, may be highly sensitive to participation bias. To
tackle this problem Laslier and Van der Straeten (2004) have built a model
that relates single-name ballots to approval ballots. The idea is that voters
never vote for a candidate they do not approve, and that the probability
that a given voter votes for the candidate c when she approves the set B
of candidates including c, is proportional to some parameter which depends
on c only. This parameter is called the single-name lever of c. This model
can be estimated and used to correct, as much as possible, for participation
bias, and then extrapolated to the entire country in order to draw general
conclusions.
The second column of Table 6 shows estimates for the candidates’ levers
(normalized to 1 for Chirac). These values show how some candidates, in
particular Jean-Marie Le Pen and Jacques Chirac were more than the others
able to convert the voters’ approval into a first round vote.
Knowing the probability that a voter who voted for candidate i in the
oﬃcial election approved of candidate j in the approval voting experiment,
and given national scores in the oﬃcial election, one can extrapolate the re-
sult of the experiment to the national level. The last two columns of Table
6 shows extrapolations of the results from Gy and Orsay to France, and the
candidates’ true national scores. It is to note that the main political event of
this election was the Extreme Right candidate Le Pen defeating the former
prime minister Jospin. While Jacques Chirac would have still been elected
president, the striking observation in Table 6 is that the extrapolation pre-
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France
Levers approval first round
Chirac 1 36.7% (1) 19.9% (1)
Le Pen 1.16 25.1% (4) 16.9% (2)
Jospin .73 32.9% (2) 16.2% (3)
Bayrou .49 27.1% (3) 6.8% (4)
Laguiller .38 16.8% (9) 5.7% (5)
Chevènement .43 22.4% (6) 5.3% (6)
Mamère .39 24.3% (5) 5.2% (7)
Besancenot .19 17.6% (8) 4.2% (8)
Saint-Josse .88 13.5% (11) 4.2% (9)
Madelin .36 20.4% (7) 3.9% (10)
Hue .53 11.3% (14) 3.4% (11)
Mégret .28 13.8% (10) 2.3% (12)
Taubira .08 12.6% (13) 2.3% (13)
Lepage .52 13.4% (12) 1.9% (14)
Boutin .17 6.7% (15) 1.2% (15)
Gluckstein .16 5.5% (16) 0.4% (16)
Table 6: France: Candidate first round levers and estimated approvals
dicts that, under approval voting, Le Pen would have fallen from the second
place to the third or fourth place.
The conclusions are that the hierarchy of candidates is modified, even if
Jacques Chirac remains quite clearly the winner. The detail of who is winning
and who is losing in this game is complex and requires candidate-specific
explanations related to the particular political situation for this election.
For instance, the analysis confirms that many voters who approved Jospin
decided to vote for Chevènement at the oﬃcial first round ; maybe the main
direct cause of Jospin’s defeat (Jaﬀré 2003).
Analysis performed by Baujard and Igersheim after the 2007 election also
conclude in the same direction: compared with two-round majority voting,
Approval Voting, and Range Voting with the 0−1−2 scale favor the centrist
candidates.
The method of the single-name levers is far from being totally satisfac-
tory when applied – as we did – to a small number of voting stations. It
should be improved but it hopefully corrects part of the important biases
which are inherent to the “field test” methodology.
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4.2 The Political Space
A ballot designed to approve, to rank, or to grade candidates contains more
information than a single-name ballot. For instance with approval voting,
one knows after the election not only the candidate scores, but also how
many voters approved both candidates A and B. With voting rules based
on individuals ranking candidates, we know how many voters rank A above
B. This data set is thus worth analyzing.
Such an analysis has been done on the data collected in 2002 with ap-
proval voting (Laslier and Van der Straeten 2002, Laslier 2006) using ad hoc
variants of Multidimensional Scaling.6 The basic idea is that two candidates
are close one from the other if they tend to be approved by the same voters.
This is a very meaningful – and simple – notion of political proximity
among candidates, which can be expressed on the basis of the votes only,
without reference to some exogenous “issue space.”
The question of the participation bias is still important, so some analysis
are restricted to the study of Gy-Les-Nonains, where the almost complete
participation makes the data set particularly valuable. Of course extrap-
olation is not meaningful but at least, we learn about French politics, as
seen from this village, and that is interesting by itself. The results are not
surprising to those who know the political landscape in France in 2002:
a strong Left-Right separation, with Jacques Chirac in the middle of the
galaxy of the right-wing candidates and the so-called “center” being in fact
one component of this galaxy.
The remark that those kind of analysis can be made on the basis of real
voting ballots can be considered as another argument in favor of the use of
voting rules in which the voter oﬃcially provides more information than the
name of a unique candidate. The fact is that an election does not only serve
to chose one or several winners. The result are also analyzed and commented
by academics, journalists and citizens because it is a privileged occasion to
learn about the country or the district. In that perspective, who could argue
against obtaining a more detailed information ?
5 Conclusions
Our objectives when running these experiments were manifold.
6Laslier (1996, 2003) developped the same tools for analyzing ranking ballots. LeRoux
and Rouanet (2004) is a modern introduction to the methods of Geometric Data Analysis.
Chiche et al. (2000) is an application.
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Public reaction to experimentation in political science. It is interesting to
know how the public would react to the use of experimentation about politics
and elections. In that respect, there is no doubt that these experiments are
very successful. People are curious about it and ready to take part. They
show very little hostility towards the idea of experimenting in politics.
Understanding voting rules. People who accept to take part in such an
experiment understand the instructions, with a possible diﬃculty, in some
cases, with incomplete ballots. Unfortunately, we do not learn from these
experiments wether they understand the way ballots are counted. This is
not a problem for rules using simple counting schemes, but it is a problem
for complex evaluative or ranking ballots.
Learning about voter behavior. The theory of how people vote under
diﬀerent voting rules is far from complete; so, one goal of the experiments
should be to observe voters’ behavior at the individual level. The experimen-
tal elections on the field are not well suited for this goal because we cannot
relate to the voter’s vote any personal characteristic, whether her/his true
vote, or her/his true ranking (or evaluation) of candidates, or her/his social
and economic characteristics.
Learning about aggregate results. Many authors insist on the fact that
diﬀerent voting rules may yield diﬀerent outcomes. Yet, little empirical
evidence is provided to support this idea on large scale elections. After elim-
inating (important) sample bias Laslier and Van der Straeten, and Baujard
and Igersheim have shown that Approval voting and 0− 1− 2 range voting
tends to favor consensus candidates.
Learning about French politics. The low approval rates and the low eval-
uations obtained by candidates show that even elected candidates (Chirac,
Sarkozy) do not have a huge support in the population. Under Approval
Voting, no candidate is able to be approved by half of the electorate. More
detailed information can be obtained on the structure of the political space.
For instance, with Approval Voting, since each voter could select the names
of several candidates on the same ballot, we know how many voters approved
each group of candidates. We can infer some information on “correlations”
between candidates - two candidates being “close” when voters treat them
alike: the same voters vote for both of them or for none of them.
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